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Can an Ethical Revival of Prudence within Prudential 
Regulation tackle Corporate Psychopathy?     
 
 
ABSTRACT.  The view that corporate psychopathy played a significant role in causing the 
global financial crisis, although insightful, paints a reductionist picture of what we present as 
the broader issue. Our broader issue is the tendency for psychopathy, narcissism and 
Machiavellianism to cluster psychologically and culturally as ‘dark leadership’ within global 
financial institutions. Strong evidence for their co-intensification across society and in 
corporations ought to alarm financial regulators. We argue that an ‘ethical revival’ of 
prudence within prudential regulation ought to be included in any package of solutions. 
Referencing research on moral muteness and the role of language in framing thoughts and 
behaviours, we recommend that regulators define prudence in an explicitly normative sense, 
an approach that may be further strengthened by drawing upon a widely appealing ethic of 
intergenerational care. An ethical revival of prudence, we argue, would allow the core 
problems of greed and myopia highlighted by corporate psychopathy theory to be addressed 
in a politically sensitive manner which recognises the pitfalls of regulating directly against 
corporate psychopathy. Furthermore, it would provide a viable conceptual framework to 
guide regulators along the treacherous path to more intrusive cultural regulation. 
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As Boddy (2011) recently observed in the Journal of Business Ethics, management 
academics increasingly view capitalism as threatened by dark leadership in general and 
corporate psychopathy in particular. As we are concerned with the corresponding challenge 
for financial regulators, a useful preliminary is to look in more detail at the aetiology and 
nature of this threat. Boddy’s threat comprises manipulative and exploitative leadership 
behaviours geared towards short term self-aggrandisement. According to his corporate 
psychopathy theory, such behaviours are increasingly present at the highest echelons of 
financial élites. Those engaging in the behaviours may succeed, for a time at least, because 
they are often respected and trusted as the most charismatic and visionary of leaders. Boddy’s 
corporate psychopaths are distinguished by their incapacity to feel moral guilt. The reason for 
this, Boddy explains, lies in the brain science which finds abnormally poor connectivity in the 
emotional centres of the psychopathic brain. Yet Karpman (1948) estimated that perhaps only 
15% of psychopaths (called ‘primary psychopaths’) possess this biogenetic disorder. The 
remaining 85% possess forms of psychopathy considered ‘secondary’ because they arise in 
individuals without the disorder. More recent literature has broadly upheld Karpman’s 
estimated proportions, while adding that primary and secondary psychopathy blur together as 
a ‘continuous mixture’ in non-institutionalised populations (Levenson et al. 1995). We know 
that although this much larger group of secondary psychopaths behaves like primary 
psychopaths, their manipulations can render them morally conflicted and susceptible to guilt 
and remorse (Skeem et al. 2003). 
            Although we share Boddy’s concerns regarding the destructive behaviours caused by 
primary psychopaths in leadership positions, we view these behaviours as arising from a 
much broader psychological base comprising not just primary and secondary psychopaths, 
but also Machiavellians and narcissists. We use the term ‘dark leadership’ to refer to the 
  
tendency for these personality patterns to cluster and co-intensify in individuals. The fact that 
many dark leaders, especially secondary psychopaths (Skeem et al. 2003) and Machiavellians 
(Drake 1995) can feel moral guilt, leads us to seek regulatory solutions which strengthen 
moral conscience. If the culprits are primary psychopaths, as Boddy assumes, his suggested 
solution to develop HR practices to screen out the rogue individuals at each rung in the 
corporate ladder makes sense. As we take dark leadership as the basic problem, we instead 
begin our search for regulatory solutions by emphasising that corporate experience can make 
and unmake dark leaders. Although a literature review of environmental determinants of 
moral conscience is well beyond the scope of this paper, we can usefully highlight Robert 
Jackall’s (1988) famous argument that experiences of patrimonial bureaucracy can produce 
the ethical desensitisations we associate with dark leaders, to emphasise that the problem is 
unlikely to reduce without determined long term regulatory effort. 
 
What is Dark Leadership? 
References to ‘dark’ or ‘dark-side’ leadership are relatively new. This is partly because 
leadership scholarship used to deny the title of leader to those who could not lead well 
(Kellerman, 2004). Hogan and Hogan (2001) refer to the growing interest in personality 
disorders that occurred during the 1970s as a turning point. It then became common to 
explain managerial failure with reference to a host of subclinical disorders which render 
managers preoccupied with self and unable to build trust or learn from experience. Dark 
leadership thus became a gallery of many psychological ills. Clear definitions have remained 
elusive ever since.  
         Our conception of dark leadership is however grounded very specifically in what 
Paulhus and Williams (2002) first called the socially aversive ‘dark triad’. Its three 
constituent constructs - Machiavellianism, psychopathy and narcissism - blur together. This 
  
blurring allows recent authors such as Boddy to write about corporate psychopaths in a way 
that captures many of the problems of dark leadership. Similarly, Higgs (2009) exploration of 
‘dark side leadership’ relies on corporate narcissism literature.  
           Jonason and Webster’s (2010) development of a 12 item dark triad measure explores 
this overlap. They call the dark triad a ‘short-term, agentic, exploitative social strategy’. Their  
measure, comprising the four best performing items for each of its three constituent 
constructs, comprises Machiavellianism items that tap interpersonal manipulativeness, 
psychopathy items that tap remorseless lack of concern for others, and narcissism items that 
tap excessive concern with admiration, status and prestige.  
          Machiavellianism and psychopathy appear particularly closely related. Christie & Geis’ 
(1970) ‘Mach scales’ were constructed from morally ambiguous statements found in 
Machiavelli’s own writings. ‘High Machs’, Christie and Geis maintain, possess a hallmark 
lack of empathy – which they call ‘encounter blindness’ - that allows them to manipulate 
others in interpersonal situations. Knowing this, we might be tempted to simply equate 
Machiavellians with psychopaths. Some commentators do. As McHoskey et al. (1998) put it, 
although successive Mach scales were developed for general populations, and scales designed 
to measure psychopathy were developed largely for clinical and criminal populations, Mach 
scales provide good global measures of both primary and secondary subclinical psychopathy.  
          Narcissism is rather different. Right at the start of our paper we presented the problem 
posed by dark leadership as having a dual aspect. The private reality of the selfish and 
remorseless manipulator seems adequately captured by the above Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy constructs. Yet the charisma that can grant these grizzly private realities access 
to the highest levels of financial élites, is perhaps best explained with reference to Narcissism 
(Sandowsky, 1995). Psychometric narcissism, as measured by Raskin and Hall’s (1981) 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory, reveals narcissists to be individuals who ‘want others to 
  
admire them’. They also ‘want others to pay attention to them’, they ‘expect special favours 
from others’, and they ‘tend to feel that things are owed to them’. An important motivator 
underlying all of these psychic needs is a power lust which often manifests within power 
contests as a strong sense of entitlement (Foster et al. 2006). Underlying this power lust is 
‘self love’ (Freud 1914). Narcissists both seek power over others and struggle constantly to 
maintain an appearance of ‘perfection’ in the eyes of others, to maintain self-esteem (Kohut, 
1971). If we are to fully appreciate the problem posed by dark leadership, then, it is important 
to bear in mind that power lust is part of the problem and taming power ought to be part of 
the solution.  
          The above references to the workings of mind lead us to acknowledge ambiguity over 
the precise nature of the dark triad. Modern psychometric research produces factor domains 
which require interpretation using theory. It must always speculate as to latent (i.e. not 
directly measurable) personality structures and processes to make sense of its findings. 
Psychometric studies of psychopathy and narcissism are no exception. They rely on older 
literatures on antisocial and narcissistic disorders which trace back through early 
psychoanalysis into pre-Freudian psychology (Millon, 1996). 
         Although it is well beyond the scope of this article to explore these speculative and 
controversial literatures, we can usefully mention that they allow us to see in extremis, 
psychological patterns whose spread across corporate leaderships can be too subtle, too 
widely distributed, and too slow growing, for us to be able to discern without simplifying 
frames. Millon’s (1994: p.283) ‘principle of syndromal continuity’ serves us well here. It 
asserts that personality disorders are simply exaggerations of normal and healthy 
psychological patterns distributed widely across general populations. Taking stock, our 
regulatory problem of dark leadership can plausibly be viewed as a problem of the universal 
human condition, whose contours sharpen for us as we refocus first towards dark leader 
  
types, and then towards the further extremities of antisocial and narcissistic disorders, each 
time finding a frame that helps us make sense of what we all think, say and do at times. 
          
Co-intensification 
Our rationale for using the three constituents of the dark triad to scope dark leadership is that 
this lets us focus on a problem that seems to be intensifying in general populations and 
corporations. Babiak and Hare (2007) famously charted the rise of corporate psychopathy. 
Lasch (1979) and Maccoby (2003) achieved academic celebrity for discussing much the same 
phenomena within a narcissism frame. Although the term ‘corporate Machiavellianism’ is not 
widely used, much indirect evidence for its rise comes from psychometric studies which find 
growing ‘Mach’ levels in general populations. This trend was noticed as early as Christie & 
Geis’ (1970) review of Mach scale research. Researchers continue to remark upon rising 
Mach levels even when not looking for them (Jakobwitz and Egan, 2006). Marshall and 
Guidi (2012) conclude that the dark triad pattern may be inculcating itself within our 
everyday common sense views of what we should desire, believe and do, which means it can 
guide our practical rationalities and help us cope with uncertainty.  
 
Dark Leaderships and Dark Triad Followerships  
If many of us have already internalised the dark triad pattern to some significant extent, then 
the possibility arises that our admonitions against dark leadership could manifest a 
psychological defence mechanism where we take aspects of our own personalities we wish to 
deny or  downplay – especially concern for self at the expense of the wider social good, and 
our preferences for materialistic consumption over long term thrift – and we then ‘project’ 
these onto scapegoat groups: the corporate psychopath; the dark leader; the ‘banker’.  
            Conte and Plutchick (1995) clarify in their review of the defence mechanism literature 
  
that most commentators consider use of the projection mechanism widespread and relatively 
uncontroversial in its basic process. The need for projection arises where the unconscious 
mind becomes aware of undesirable thoughts that, should they enter consciousness, would be 
punished by conscience. This causes anxiety, to which conscious mind can attribute no 
obvious cause. However our unconscious minds can quell this anxiety by imagining these 
thoughts to be the thoughts of others. In other words it can ‘project’ our undesirable thoughts 
onto others. The moral punitiveness we might otherwise direct towards ourselves can now 
discharge safely towards our selected target groups. As the workings of projection are wholly 
unconscious, it can shape our thoughts without our knowledge or consent. Given Stiglitz’ 
(2010) argument that it is we ourselves who ultimately caused the recent financial crisis 
owing to our growing addiction to credit, it can be argued that we might all have a powerful 
and sinister motive to project our intensifying dark triad attributes onto dark leaderships. We 
need to be careful, then, when discussing possible regulatory measures against dark 
leaderships. We could be pushing a commonly used projection mechanism down a dangerous 
path towards cultural amplification (in the media, in politics, and conceivably in regulatory 
practice) at which point action against the target group becomes, psychodynamically 
speaking, a witch-hunt.  
 
The Pros and Cons of Dark Leaders: enduring ambivalence to a well-known type  
A simple sociological metanarrative drawn from Italian social theory allows us to appreciate 
that what Marshall (2007, p.136-142) calls the recent ‘rise of the dark triad’ deserves to be 
placed in historical perspective. This establishes important context for how we frame our 
regulatory problem in the following section. There, our argument will run, regulators need to 
tread very carefully when regulating against a phenomenon which has been valued for 
centuries for its positive aspects and is therefore capable of eliciting intense ambivalence.  
  
            Marshall (2007, p.21-25) follows Rebhorn (1988) in drawing a historical parallel 
between modern capitalism and the renaissance. In each case we see the creation of 
detraditionalised and displaced ways of life where a new type of person - someone who is 
both produced by, and can thrive upon, complexity and change – emerges and begins to 
reshape how people see themselves. Rebhorn points out that the renaissance mind agonised 
over the emergence of this new type. Boccaccio represented it as a desperate itinerant crook. 
His Decameron was filled with charlatans and roguish monks, swept towards moral ignominy 
and depravity by war, famine and plague. For Niccolò Machiavelli, however, such 
individuals were not merely the psychological fallout produced by the sweeping social and 
economic changes of the renaissance. Machiavelli saw the leadership potential within this 
type, viewing it simultaneously as a modern expression of human nature and as an aptitude 
for political rule that has proved decisive throughout ancient and modern history. Hence in 
chapter XVIII of The Prince (Machiavelli, 1513/1966) we are told that the ‘fox’ who knows 
how to use the strategy of ‘fraud’ can ‘avoid the snares’.  
        Five hundred years later, the sociologist Vilfredo Pareto became deeply impressed by 
Machiavelli’s leadership insight, and especially by his use of the fox caricature. Hence he 
brought these together once more to develop what we now call classical elite theory (Pareto, 
1901/1991). At the heart of that theory, almost a century before Babiak and Hare (2007) 
wrote on corporate psychopathy, and long before Lasch (1979) and Maccoby (2003) wrote on 
corporate narcissism, we find the idea that a cunning, manipulative, self-seeking type is 
always likely to prosper within the most senior echelons of business and political elites, 
owing to its superior ability to negotiate complex and changing social networks, jettisoning 
loyalties to people and to ideas whenever necessary. In Pareto (1935) in particular, we find 
this same elite theory now set within a broader macrosociological framework, warning that 
within ‘individualised’ social forms, foxes can proliferate to levels which allow them to exert 
  
unusually pronounced influence on elite decision making. These ‘vulpine’ elites may cope 
admirably with social complexification. Yet the intensifications of greed, materialism, and 
short term risk taking that they bring increasingly threaten elite downfall. And so decades 
before the contemporary debate within management literature as to whether corporate 
psychopaths threaten modern capitalism, we find Pareto representing history as a ‘graveyard 
of aristocracies’ owing to the leadership collapses which Machiavelli’s foxes have 
precipitated many times before throughout history, in both economic and political life.  
          Pareto’s view is arguably ahead of much of the modern corporate psychopathy and 
dark leadership literature in one important respect. Writing as a sociological functionalist 
who views Machiavelli’s foxes as simultaneously adaptive and maladaptive to their 
environments, in differing respects, he demands that we consider both strengths and 
weaknesses if we are to achieve a full sociological understanding of the leadership 
phenomenon. Consider that all of the terms which we have used so far to discuss the 
phenomenon have contained strong negative evaluations. As Italian social theory urges us to 
reconsider ‘dark leadership’ as a psychological and cultural phenomenon with many pros as 
well as cons, let us briefly consider some of these with reference to modern literatures. 
            Many dark leader attributes – lack of empathy, ruthless preoccupation with self-
promotion, treacherous disloyalty to persons, groups, and collective beliefs – are also widely 
considered to be the very sources of their success. Their vulpine cunning recognises that all 
loyalties and emotional attachments can quickly become impediments to upward social 
mobility (Machiavelli’s snares) within social environments characterised by complexity and 
flux. Indeed, Christie and Geis’ (1970) study of Machiavellianism stressed that it is 
impossible not to envy these successful manipulators. Their emotional aloofness not only 
facilitates personal success, but allows them to become masters of self-reinvention who can 
recover quickly from failure – as many might associate with the powerful myth of the 
  
American dream. These individuals have, after all, been celebrated as ’Protean selves’ who 
show ’resilience in an age of fragmentation’ (Lifton, 1993). They can also be ‘defenders of 
freedom’, because unbound by collective beliefs, and therefore less likely to be hoodwinked 
by charismatic leaders, they are better able to expose leader malfeasance, just as they are 
better able to engage in it (Burnham, 1943). It is popularly argued (e.g. Galbraith, 2009) that 
false collective beliefs, in particular, veil fraudulent practices within financial systems. The 
dark leader’s faculty of critical scrutiny and refusal to internalise collective belief seems to 
place them in a psychologically privileged position from which they can pick away at false 
collective belief, possibly with benign implications for fairness and transparency within 
financial systems. The attention which Jackall (1988, p. 203-204) gives to how ‘narcissists of 
high rank’ operate within bureaucracies, provides a good way to develop this argument. On 
the one hand, Jackall stresses that narcissists learn to subordinate themselves through a 
‘psychic asceticism’ which suppresses their powerful expressive tendencies. Yet this 
produces what he calls a ‘curious sense of guilt’ which can find harmful outlet in private 
emotional life (e.g. as alcoholism, depression and rage). We suggest that such narcissists are 
likely to crave whistleblowing opportunities that offer good prospects for success, which will 
allow them to cast off this crippling asceticism and thrive as expressive showmen or women.  
           The cultural coevolution of their social relations flexibility with democratic 
individualism has also been discussed (e.g. Gellner, 1997). And for all that such individuals 
are commonly derided as self-seeking ‘entitlement thinkers’, it is often no bad thing to fight 
for rights. These are useful whistleblower traits which can advance causes of justice, fairness, 
integrity and open deliberation within organisations. 
          This type is also commonly admired for its charm and social astuteness, which 
evolutionary psychologists have put down in part to hardwired ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ 
(Byrne and Whitten, 1997). More psychoanalytically inclined commentators explain these 
  
characteristics differently. In Kohut (1971) the basic psychological process is associated with 
the ‘hollow self’. Narcissists compensate for identity confusion by manifesting whatever 
social identity will work well for them in each passing situation. Similarly, in Cleckley’s 
classic work on psychopathy, we find psychopaths presented as ‘persistently lacking the 
ability to become aware of what the most important experiences of life mean to others’ 
(Cleckely 1941, p. 371). Yet the powers of mimicry they develop to compensate for this are 
incredible. Their social cognitive apparatus operates as a “subtly constructed reflex machine” 
(ibid, p. 372) which throws our own emotions back at us, convincing us of an illusory 
emotional connection which the psychopath can then exploit ruthlessly. As Babiak & Hare 
(2007) observe, the ‘political’ organisational environments that displaced more traditional 
role-constrained environments during the organisation wars of the 1970s, gave this type a 
historic chance to flourish within organisations as never before. Arguably, we can value the 
responsive theatricality of these smooth political operators as a core leadership skill fit for the 
modern organisation, particularly as issues of corporate image, identity and reputation 
continue to grow in perceived importance.  
          We may worry about possible confluences of charismatic leadership, pliable 
followership and unstable situation, sometimes called ‘toxic triangles’ (Padilla et al., 2007). 
Although their argument resists easy summary, the basic problem here is where ‘destructive 
leaders’ pursue private agendas in many different ‘destructive conditions’ including those 
created by poor governance, system instability, upheaval, centralising authority, cultural 
homogeneity, and a variety of social discontent factors. Much of the destructiveness within 
destructive leadership arises from its paternalism under destructive conditions. Charisma is 
used within destructive leadership to subdue and deceive followers, not to empower them, 
collaborate with them, share burdens with them, or unleash their creativity. Hence destructive 
conditions can easily deteriorate where destructive leadership prevails. Furthermore, 
  
destructive leadership can often conceal deteriorating crisis situations by disseminating false 
confidence to gullible followers who crave reassurance more than truth. Consider for 
example Enron President Jeffrey Skilling’s repeatedly successful reassurances to Enron 
employees that they need not sell their stock when the firm was on the edge of bankruptcy.    
            Yet despite this potential for charismatic leadership to slide into destructiveness, we 
can still acknowledge the utility for organisations in having leaders with exceptional skill in 
providing reassurance when that is called for. Oratorical and dramaturgical skills can be 
highly prized within constructive leaderships (Gardner and Avolio, 1998).  Requirements for 
such skills can only grow as organisational crises and change processes grow more 
commonplace.  
          Machiavelli and Pareto called such individuals ‘foxes’. Indeed, the great survivor of 
Italian Politics, Giulio Andreotti, remains the archetypal fox to many Italians. In business 
ethics literatures we label such people corporate psychopaths or dark leaders. These terms 
strip away the possibilities for respect or even affection that might be shown towards a 
cunning old fox. We emphasise, then, that our character sketches, and our fascinated 
ambivalence, date back at least five hundred years, are deeply inscribed within our folk 
psychologies, and, most crucially of all, encompass positive as well as negative evaluations. 
We know well that these are rich personality types with many strengths and weaknesses. And 
perhaps it is the terminology that we inherit from the old Italian tradition that reminds us of 
this most effectively. We cannot be content with the negative labels in widespread use today. 
 
Framing the Regulatory Problem 
Taking stock, the remainder of our paper will toe the old Italian line and label such 
individuals ‘foxes’. Dark leadership thus becomes ‘vulpine leadership’. This fairer and more 
neutral terminology has important implications for how we conceive our regulatory problem. 
  
No longer can we reasonably view the aim of regulatory intervention as the eradication or 
suppression of a rogue personality pattern. Instead we must concern ourselves with 
supporting its ethical development so that regulatees may continue to harness its talents. 
Furthermore, the preceding discussion leads us to envisage regulation as encountering 
problems related to the intense ambivalence which this pattern can elicit when we detect it 
both within ourselves and within organisations.  Clearly, any regulation aimed at tackling 
‘vulpine leadership’ will need to package, explain and justify itself with great sensitivity if it 
is to build stakeholder confidence in what will surely be a volatile public scrutiny 
environment.  
      There is ample evidence, based on what we know about the common media practice of 
toying with popular ambivalence, to forewarn us that regulators should take this political 
sensitivity problem very seriously. Mere mention of the dark triad, or any of its three 
constituents, seems to touch a funny bone within popular culture. Each passing year gives rise 
to research supporting the rise of the dark triad theory. This is often very widely publicised, 
most probably because it re-orchestrates the intense ambivalence we have sketched above. It 
follows that any financial regulator perceived to be taking on individuals labelled as 
corporate psychopaths or dark leaders might well instigate a media storm. Business lobbies 
would, not without merit, accuse regulators or governments of suppressing what are 
obviously well known positives within this personality pattern. They may well try to sink 
regulatory efforts by representing them as populist exercises in banker bashing repackaged at 
levels of vulgar stereotypy no public body should stoop to.  
         We suggest that part of the solution to this regulatory dilemma can be terminological. 
The remainder of our paper argues that regulators can frame the problem in such a way as to 
render regulation more politically palatable and better able to engage moral conscience. Yet 
we propose a major shift of focus to enable this – one that brings together hitherto 
  
unconnected literatures. The remainder of our paper argues that it is better to frame the 
regulatory problem, not negatively and with reference to any particular kind of dysfunctional 
leadership, but positively with reference to the need for ‘prudence’ within decision-making 
culture and psychology. This terminological turn, we suggest, sets the scene where scrutiny 
of individual corporate managers, and of whole corporate cultures, can value the many 
positives that vulpine leaders can contribute, whilst also seeking to cultivate their abilities to 
think ethically and well over the longer term. 
          Philosophers such as Wittgenstein, social theorists such as Foucault, and linguists such 
as Chomsky all agree on the centrality of discourse – that our ideas are dependent upon the 
words we use to describe them (Edelman, 1985). The absence of ethical language can lead to 
moral muteness - a term coined by Bird and Waters (1989) to describe the lack of ease with 
normative language which constrains managers from accounting for their actions in 
normative terms, or speaking out when ethical breaches are observed. This lack of confidence 
in using ethical terms has behavioural implications. For example, Trevino (1987, cited in 
Trevino and Nelson, 2010) found when faced with an ethical dilemma, business managers 
who talked in normative terms such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ were more likely to take the 
ethical decision than those who talked in business terms such as ‘costs.’ 
           One way ‘foxes’ have gained and maintained power is by co-opting language. Liendo 
(2001) argues that ‘business as war’ metaphors abound in business discourse (e.g. ‘strategy’, 
‘captive markets’). These metaphors reflect the competitive nature of the business world, but 
importantly also legitimise, perpetuate and create this reality. In addition, alongside corporate 
malfeasance is inevitably to be found a host of euphemisms that distort and disguise the real 
consequences to society, for example bribes become ‘tips’ or ‘consultancy fees.’ The role of 
language in co-opting organisational culture is vividly portrayed in Cohn's (1987) study of 
language used in the defence industry. Writing as a participant observer, she reports how 
  
usages of language shift the referent from humans to weapons, where death becomes 
‘collateral damage’ and where talk of ‘clean bombs’ and ‘counterforce exchanges’ disguise 
the human reality. Cohn noted how quickly she moved from being shocked by the cold 
bloodedness of the talk, to becoming excited by it. More worryingly, she also found that the 
terminology both disguised the moral implications of policies and steered her internal 
consciousness so that some thoughts and values simply could not be expressed. Similarly, 
Partnoy (1998), a former derivative trader on Wall Street, portrays how language and 
terminology are used in the finance sector. While the securities traded had innocuous names 
used in public (e.g. PERLS, BIDS), the insider language of the traders demonstrated that 
corporate psychopathy was so advanced and so confident in its own position that euphemisms 
were not even bothered with; indeed, policies such as ‘rip the customer’s face off’, and 
references to subprime mortgages as ‘liar loans’ indicate that traders openly revelled in their 
lack of ethics. More tellingly, like Cohn, Partnoy reports that despite his ethical qualms, the 
corporate culture mediated by its own insider discourse, made it almost impossible to express 
more ethical values. 
 Some of the blame for the marginalisation of moral language in business has been 
attributed to management theory and management education. For example Ghoshal (2005) 
claims that, by adopting the ‘scientific model,’ management theories ignore the role of human 
intentionality, and thus any notion of moral responsibility, resulting in prescriptions that are 
not simply value free but actively amoral. 
 We suggest that regulators can counter this ethical fading of corporate terminology 
through the use of ethical regulatory discourse. In making this suggestion, we are not naively 
underplaying the fact that vulpine leaders are expert in maintaining public veneers of ethical 
concern and commitment which they might mock in private. Rather, our argument simply 
draws upon the power of ethical discourse by emphasising that such hypocrisies often resolve 
  
over time through internalisations of the ethical façade. The political scientist Jon Elster uses 
a very memorable term – “the civilizing force of hypocrisy” – to refer to the slow tendency 
for publicly used terminology to influence the minds of even the most self-interested of 
people who participate in public discourse (Elster 1998, p.12). Much is at stake here. If 
vulpine leaders can be encouraged to internalise public discourse, then the effect can be to 
sensitise them to the full and longer term consequences of their business decisions. Much of 
Patricia Werhane’s (1999) writing on ‘moral imagination’ deals with the cultivation of this 
large and long view, leading us to appreciate that to think ethically and to think well are 
interdependent. Here we must reiterate once more that our ‘vulpine leaders’ comprise many 
morally conflicted individuals. Hence we can view them as are susceptible to the cultivation 
of moral imagination. Ethical language, we therefore suggest, can help make vulpine leaders 
into better and more ethical leaders.  
 
Rediscovering Prudence 
Prudence is a term which is already highly visible within global regulatory discourse. We 
argue that if prudential regulators are prepared to restore the concept of prudence to re-
engage with its classical range of meanings, then they may be able to rediscover within it a 
simple cultural, psychological and ethical prescription for good judgment which can help 
protect firms from the excesses of vulpine leadership. 
        Of course, prudence need not be concerned with ethics at all. Some modern academic 
usages of the term treat ‘prudential foresight’ and ‘altruistic foresight’ as wholly different 
(Thompson et al., 1997). Kimball (1990) simply defines prudence as ‘the propensity to 
prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty’. These views evolve from much older 
literatures which treat prudence solely as an enabling skill for the pursuit of self-interest. Hoy 
(1958), for example, cites Burke’s definition of the prudent person as someone ‘capable of 
  
deliberating well on what is good and expedient for his own interest’.  
       This ethically agnostic view of prudence seems to prevail today amongst governments 
striving to improve prudential regulation in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Take for 
example the major announcement (BoE and FSA, 2011) issued by the UK government’s 
Treasury department in May 2011, confirming that the old ‘Financial Services Authority’ 
(FSA) regulator would soon be replaced by a new ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ (PRA) 
and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). In this new ‘twin peaks’ system of financial 
regulation, the PRA will mitigate risks to the stability of the financial system, whilst the FCA 
will mitigate risks associated with confidence in that system. This major announcement was 
what some might regard as a missed opportunity to float some workable, ethically meaningful 
conceptualisation of ‘prudence’ to pave the way for a bolder and more ethically prescriptive 
approach to financial regulation. The document announces that the PRA will ask firms to 
review their firm-wide cultures under circumstances where regulatory outcomes are not being 
met, but it will not specify what these cultures should consist of (para 59). This UK example 
illustrates well the general tendency for regulators to restrict themselves to an output-based 
view of prudence where the word prudence simply equates to the ongoing soundness of 
financial institutions and financial markets. To be prudent, on that view, is not to possess any 
particular habit of mind and will. It is simply to maintain an ability to meet financial 
obligations.  
            Yet our UK example also illustrates how this might change in future. There remains 
ambiguity in the new PRA’s stance towards the possibility that regulation might help instil 
some ethical compass within decision-making culture and psychology to facilitate the 
decision-maker’s regard for the longer term and so help ensure prudence soundness is 
maintained. On the one hand, the (2011) document stipulates that the regulator will consider 
there to be no ‘right culture’. In the event of poor regulatory compliance, regulatee financial 
  
firms themselves will most likely be deemed the best arbiters of how to adjust their cultures 
to improve regulatory outcomes. Yet there are nonetheless grounds for supposing the new 
PRA might increasingly experiment with cultural regulation by assessing and making ethical 
judgments about corporate cultures and individual managers. As FSA Chief Executive Hector 
Sants (2010) puts it, the ‘rubicon’ of cultural regulation has ‘already been crossed’ to some 
extent by the outgoing FSA regulator, at least to the extent that it routinely began scrutinising 
corporate cultures to understand their effects on regulatory outcomes. Sants stops short of 
recommending that financial regulators should specify desirable cultural properties, yet he 
does maintain that individual character and judgment ought to be scrutinised – an interesting 
claim within the context of the PRA’s power to sack managers of financial firms to which it 
gives higher risk ratings. 
            Ethical views of prudence are useful within that scrutiny context. More generally, 
however, they also set us thinking about prospects for giving regulatory support to 
organisational culture and psychology by specifying some minimum standard for what an 
organisational culture ought to include at its ethical core. We suggest that the new PRA, and 
other prudential regulators across the globe which have been granted new powers in response 
to the financial crisis, should embark on their new missions with a determination to develop 
bold demands for cultures of prudence. However this requires clear and transparent meaning. 
What should it mean? Prudence has always involved some element of ‘foresight’ or ‘clear-
sightedness’ which permits agile temporal framing for decisions and consequences. On this, 
at least, ethical and ethically agnostic viewpoints can agree. Whereas imprudence has always 
been a synonym for rashness, or for thinking myopically without regard to the longer term, 
prudent individuals have always been represented as capable of making inter-temporal trade-
offs between short term and long term interests. Ethical approaches vary in how they view the 
motivations that underlie these trade-off decisions. In the concept’s ancient Greek origins, for 
  
example, prudence equates to what Aristotle called ‘phronesis’. Book VI of Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics described phronesis as ‘a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with 
regard to the things that are good or bad for man’ (Cooper, 1975). This of course only makes 
sense with reference to the aspirational humanistic view of human flourishing that still thrives 
today. The Christian Scholastics, who revived Aristotle’s thought and set about further 
developing the concept, remained fundamentally concerned with the temporal context for 
good judgment and the cultivation of virtue, yet they justified this concern differently. 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica extended this context from the individual lifespan to 
the soul that survives death. It now became prudent to choose spiritual over worldly 
happiness. Aquinas’ forms of false prudence by contrast, are bound by worldly goals. Within 
both Aristotle and Aquinas, then, concern for the longer term is justifiable with reference to 
constructs – Aristotle’s humanism and Aquinas’ view of the soul – which taken together 
might begin to form a pluralistic meta-ethical base for an ethically reinvigorated 
understanding of prudence which regulators could find valuable. 
           However, when we look closer at Aquinas’ view of prudence we also find a very 
succinct framing of the problem posed by dark leadership. As Pieper’s (1966) classic reading 
of Aquinas explains, one of his forms of false prudence is ‘covetousness’. Pieper describes 
this as referring to ‘anxious senility, desperate self-preservation, over-riding concern for 
confirmation and security’. This simple sentence brings together classic narcissistic themes 
which lie at the core of the dark triad pattern. Narcissists, as we have already argued, feel 
threatened by power wielded by others. Here we might also usefully mention their fear of 
ageing, which Lasch’s (1979) work on the rise of narcissism devotes an entire chapter to. 
Narcsissists, the argument runs, are terrified of the prospect that they may one day no longer 
be admired for their ‘beauty, charm, celebrity or power’ because when that day comes their 
self-esteem systems will crumble (Lasch 1979, p.210). The implications for the narcissist’s 
  
general cognition are far-reaching. They come to focus their anxieties almost exclusively 
around their immediate predicaments, instead of looking forward more selflessly to the 
distant future, or indeed backward to achieve a sense of historical perspective. Narcissists 
within business organisations often focus upon gaining, maintaining and applying personal 
power to exert personal influence. Many succumb to inflated self-importance. They believe 
they need to ‘make their mark’ quickly on their organisation, as those who follow will lack 
ability or opportunity. Many of their decisions are intended as displays of ‘narcissistic 
grandiosity’ (Raskin and Terry, 1988) which test the limits of personal power and status, 
sometimes at the expense of responsible long term custodianship. The temporal framing of 
decisions by such individuals may well shrink around the present and near future under the 
combined weight of these narrow obsessions. Perhaps, therefore, these are the vulpine 
leadership dynamics which ‘prudential regulation’, ethically redefined, should target and seek 
to overcome. 
If prudence is to be ethically revived and used within regulatory discourse to mitigate 
the darker side (especially involving myopic decision-making) of vulpine leadership, then 
clarity and simplicity are important for definitional purposes. At the same time, meta-ethical 
pluralism is desirable if the term is to be ethically meaningful to the broadest possible 
audience. So how can prudence be articulated in simple terms, whilst also permitting multiple 
meta-ethical interpretations and thereby connecting with millions of ethical consciences that 
are perhaps grappling with their imprudence on very personal levels? We suggest that 
construing prudence as an ethic of intergenerational care fits comfortably with current 
discourse which views sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(WCED, 1987).  
          Erik Erikson’s (1950) lifespan theory provides some valuable psychological context for 
  
this ethic. The theory divides the human lifespan into eight consecutive life stages. The 
seventh relates to middle adulthood where career pinnacles have been reached. Erikson 
characterised this life stage as one of psychic conflict between conflicting tendencies towards 
‘generativity’ and ‘stagnation’. Erikson’s generativity involves productive activity motivated 
by a farsighted ethic of intergenerational care; stagnation, however, equates to narcissistic 
self absorption (Hoare, 2001). Erikson thus sets us thinking of a universally experienced life 
stage conflict where a motivated ethic we can call ‘prudence’ and a state of ethical decay 
which we can equate with the dark side of vulpine leadership, compete in an endless see-saw 
to be the dominant influences on personality and, by extension, culture. At this point we can 
better appreciate that integrating the ethic of intergenerational care into conceptions of 
prudence might provide additional armoury against the ubiquitous problem of narcissistic 
self-absorption, for as Freud claims: “parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so 
childish, is nothing but the parents’ narcissism born again” (Freud, 1914: 91). 
 
Conclusion: prudence as an ethic of intergenerational care  
It is clear that a simple change of terminology will not by itself overturn corporate 
psychopathy. Yet we argue that the lack of ethically charged terminology has played into the 
hands of corporate psychopaths. It has also given rise to ‘moral muteness’ on the part of 
fellow workers who lack an acceptable vocabulary with which to voice their objections. We 
propose that ‘prudence’ as a concept can work harder than it does currently, by presenting an 
explicitly normative prescription for behaviour. Undoubtedly there will remain those that 
violate such prescriptions. However they will at least have to answer for their actions in 
normative terms, and while they may indeed demonstrate great hypocrisy they at least can be 
accused of it by regulators who increasingly regard it as their duty to judge ethical character.      
            This may seem like a minor gain, but considered against insider testimonials (Partnoy, 
  
1998) that highlight the openness with which unethical practices are flaunted (e.g. policies 
such ‘rip the customers’ face off’ and  ‘liar loans’) this is a necessary direction to take. 
Integrating the ethic of intergenerational care into our conception of prudence may further 
extend its reach, allowing it to tap into current sustainability discourses, and to provide 
additional insight into the instinctive motivations and driving forces of managers. Most 
importantly, might commonly understood requirements for intergenerational care reactivate 
the moral consciences of vulpine leaders themselves? Given that the problem of vulpine 
leadership is already deeply embedded within our folk psychology, perhaps this is also where 
we might find an answer to our question. Michael Douglas’ character ‘Gordon Gekko’, who 
appears in Oliver Stone’s two (1987 and 2010) Wall Street films, is arguably cinema’s most 
famous criminally psychopathic banker. Gekko steps back from the brink of stealing his 
daughter’s last $100 Million, when, in the sudden character arc that brings Wall Street II to its 
close, he first sees his unborn grand-daughter in an antenatal scan. Such moral u-turns and 
unexpected outbreaks of intergenerational care are not confined to fiction, as shown by the 
much publicised about-turn made by Lee Scott CEO of Wal-mart on his approaches to Wal-
mart’s environmental impacts which seem to have been triggered by love of a granddaughter 
(Little, 2006). Whilst Boddy’s (2011) small hard core of primary psychopaths are likely to 
remain obdurate to such influences, a much larger throng of secondary psychopaths, 
narcissists and Machiavellians, may find they have some transformative power over their 
conflicted moral consciences. Perhaps invigorating the ethic of prudence, drawing on current 
discourse of inter-generational care, and highlighting connotations of influence over not only 
the present, but the future, may appeal both to the dark side of so-called corporate 
psychopaths – their love of power, but also to the other side – simply love.  
We conclude by accepting that the word ‘love’ in an academic paper may ignite 
shocked outrage and mutterings of inappropriateness, yet care for others is surely the core of 
  
ethical behaviour, and love a key motivator. As argued in this paper, the general lack of ease 
with such normative language, both in business (Bird and Waters, 1989) and in academia 
(Ghoshal, 2005) must bear part of the blame for the ease with which corporate psychopathy 
has prevailed. A relabeling of the problem, first as ‘dark leadership’, then as ‘the dark side of 
vulpine leadership’, is called for to fully appreciate what is at stake. An ethical revival of 
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